Diarra: Tout ou Rien?

On 4 October 2024 the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) decided that article 9.1 and parts of article 17 of FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (“RSTP”) are contrary to (subject to any justification) articles 45 and (subject to any permitted exemption) 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).[1]

The CJEU’s decision arose from a claim brought by former French footballer Lassana Diarra (“LD”) against FIFA and Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association (“URBSFA”) seeking damages for loss of earnings surrounding LD’s termination of his playing contract with FC Lokomotiv Moscow in 2014 and LD’s subsequent inability to obtain employment with Belgian football club Royal Charleroi SC for a period thereafter due to the operation of the above-stated provisions of the RSTP.

LD’s case was that the above-stated provisions of the RSTP were unlawful for being contrary to articles 45 and 101 of the TFEU.

At first instance before the Commercial Court of Hainaut, Charleroi Division (Belgium), LD was successful in his claim against FIFA and URBSFA. FIFA subsequently appealed against that first instance decision to the Court of Appeal of Mons (Belgium) and, together with URBSFA as interveners in that appeal, submitted that the above-stated provisions of the RSTP are compatible with articles 45 and 101 of the TFEU.

In such circumstances, the Court of Appeal of Mons made a request to the CJEU seeking a ruling on whether the above-stated provisions of the RSTP are compatible with articles 45 and 101 of the TFEU (“the Request”).

This article will provide further detail to the Request and summarise Advocate General Szpunar’s opinion provided on 30.4.2024 (“the AG’s Opinion”)[2], explain the CJEU’s decision, and then provide analysis of the likely impact of the CJEU’s decision.

Relevant background

The Request

The relevant provisions of the RSTP are as follows:

Article 9.1 provides that a player registered with one football association may only be registered at a new football association (i.e., transferring from one country to another) once the new football association has received an International Transfer Certificate (“ITC”). FIFA’s commentary on the RSTP (“the RSTP Commentary”) article 9.1 describes the ITC as ‘the key document for registering players following an international transfer’. Article 9.1 also refers to RSTP Annexe 3 for the procedure applicable for issuing an ITC. The 2014 version of the RSTP Annexe 3, article 8.2.7 (which is the version subject to the Request) stated:

‘The former association shall not deliver an ITC for a professional player if a contractual dispute on grounds of the circumstances stipulated in Annexe 3, article 8.2 paragraph 4 b) has arisen between the former club and the professional player […]’.

The above-stated ‘Annexe 3, article 8.2 paragraph 4 b)’ allowed the former association to reject the ITC on the basis of ‘either that the contract between the former club and the professional player has not expired or that there has been no mutual agreement regarding its early termination’. This provision is now found in RSTP Annexe 3, article 11.3. Further, it should be noted that the RSTP Commentary explains the following in respect of this provision and RSTP article 22 (see pg. 457-458 of the RSTP Commentary (2023)):

‘[…] there is only one valid reason to refuse to issue an ITC, i.e., where there is a contractual dispute between the former club and the player […] If the member association to which the player’s former club is affiliated refuses to issue the ITC, the member association requesting the ITC may ask FIFA to register the player. The [Player Status Chamber] will then have to decide whether the player can be registered for the new club even though there is an ongoing contractual dispute between the player and their former club. Decisions in such cases are without prejudice to any decision the [Dispute Resolution Chamber] may make in relation to the underlying contractual dispute between the player and their former club’.

It should also be noted that FIFA’s International Player Transfer Guide (July 2024) explains the following:

‘It is important to point out that, in line with the jurisprudence of the FIFA Football Tribunal and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), even if a contractual dispute over an ITC arises, FIFA cannot compel players to remain employed with a particular employer. In this sense, in case of an ITC dispute and, upon request of the new association, the FIFA Football Tribunal will authorise the player registration with their new association, without prejudice to any claim being lodged with FIFA in accordance with article 22 of the RSTP’.

Accordingly, while the CJEU’s decision is significant on the whole, the above-stated amendments and practical application of the RSTP temper the CJEU’s decision in respect of RSTP article 9.1.

Article 17.2 provides that where a player breaches a contract with their club without just cause and the player subsequently owes that old club compensation (calculated in accordance with RSTP Article 17.1), then upon the player joining a new club the player and the new club will be jointly and severally liable for payment of compensation to the old club.

Article 17.4 further provides that if the new clubs signs the player within a ‘protected period’ (as defined in the RSTP), the new club will also be ‘presumed, unless established to the contrary [… to have] induced that professional to commit a breach’ and shall accordingly ‘be banned from registering any new players […] for two entire and consecutive registration periods’.

The Request referred the following questions for determination by the CJEU:

‘Are articles 45 and 101 of the [TFEU] to be interpreted as precluding:

- the principle that the player and the club wishing to employ him are jointly and severally liable in respect of the compensation due to the club whose contract with the player has been terminated without just cause, as stipulated in Article 17.2 of the FIFA RSTP, in conjunction with the sporting sanctions provided for in Article 17.4 of those regulations and the financial sanctions provided for in Article 17.1;

- the ability of the association to which the player’s former club belongs not to deliver the international transfer certificate required if the player is to be employed by a new club, where there is a dispute between that former club and the player (Article 9.1 of the RSTP and Article 8.2.7 of Annex 3 to the RSTP)’.[3]

The AG’s Opinion

The AG’s Opinion explains that TFEU article 45 ‘precludes any measure whether it is based on nationality or is applicable without regard to nationality, which might place EU nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of a Member State other than their Member State of origin, by preventing or deterring them from leaving the latter’.[4]

In respect of the above-stated provisions of the RSTP and their compatibility with TFEU article 45, the AG’s Opinion stated:

‘[…] the provisions providing for joint and several liability of the new club for payment of the compensation for breach of contract owed by the professional player to his or her former club in the event of premature termination of a contract without just cause are such as to discourage or dissuade clubs from hiring the player for fear of a financial risk. The same applies with respect to the sporting sanction consisting of a ban on registering new players at national or international level […] as well as the non-issuance of the ITC. This can effectively prevent a player from exercising his or her profession with a club located in another Member State.

[…] What counts is that players are effectively impeded from moving to clubs in other Member States. This is precisely what happened in the present case […]’.[5]

In the AG’s Opinion, whilst FIFA’s and URBSFA’s claims that the above-stated provisions of the RSTP ‘seek to maintain contractual stability in the professional football sector’ could be accepted as grounds ‘as overriding reasons relating to the public interest’, the above-stated provisions did not pass the test of proportionality.[6] The AG’s Opinion explains that RSTP articles 17.2 and 17.4 ‘go beyond what is necessary to pursue the legitimate objective, in a situation in which the new club has played no role in the termination of the contract’.[7] Further, the AG’s Opinion explains that RSTP ‘Annexe 3, article 8.2 paragraph 4 b)’ ‘carries the risk of a refusal of the issuance of the ITC, based on a mere allegation that the player has not complied with the terms of his or her contract and that the club was forced to terminate the contract because of the player’s alleged failure to comply with his or her contractual obligations’.[8] Again, this was considered to ‘not be necessary for the attainment of contractual stability’.[9]

The AG’s opinion also explains that pursuant to TFEU article 101(1) ‘all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market are incompatible with the internal market’.[10]

In respect of the above-stated provisions of the RSTP and their compatibility with TFEU article 101(1), the AG’s Opinion identified that the above-stated provisions ‘constitute decisions by associations of undertakings[…] which are capable of affecting trade between Member States’.[11] Further, the AG’s Opinion identified that the above-stated provisions of the RSTP do, by their objective, restrict competition and breach TFEU article 101(1):

‘[…] the consequences of a player terminating a contract without just cause are so draconian that it is highly unlikely that a player will go down this route.  The contested provisions are designed in such a way as to have a deterrent effect and send a chill down each player’s spine. The same applies with respect to clubs potentially interested in luring players into new opportunities while the latter are in a running contract […]

Thus, by their very nature, the contested provisions limit the possibility for players to switch clubs and, conversely, for (new) clubs to hire players, in a situation where a player has terminated his or her contract without just cause […]

In so doing, the contested provisions, by limiting clubs’ ability to recruit players, necessarily affect competition between clubs on the market for the acquisition of professional players.

These elements are strong indicators that there is a restriction of competition by object […]’.[12]

In the AG’s Opinion, the requirements for a possible exemption under TFEU 101(3) were ‘clearly not met’ and were not examined any further.[13]

The CJEU’s decision (“Diarra”)

The CJEU followed the AG’s Opinion. In a judgment that might well prove more significant for its practical effect on the clubs and players than for any contribution to the development of EU sports law jurisprudence, the CJEU applied a familiar structure of analysis. Diarra confirmed a principle well-established in the CJEU’s decision-making as well as in the EU’s sports policy: sports’ governing bodies such as FIFA have a right to self-regulation within the limits of the law.

Diarra has already been analysed by several academics, including: Duval who predicted a major impact on the football industry equivalent to C‑415/93 Bosman [1995]; Weatherill who argued that the impact will involve the adoption of more predictable and less restrictive rules with, as of yet, uncertain design; and van der Burg who warned that Diarra neglects the effects of transfer fees on competition in consumer markets and the interests of football supporters. We provide our own view of the judgment and contribute to the existing discussion.

In summary, the challenged rules were found to be liable to impede both free movement of a football player who unilaterally terminates their contract (TFEU article 45), as well as the competition between the clubs in the market for recruitment of football players (TFEU article 101).

Even though the possibility of defence exists under both competition and free movement provisions, under TFEU article 45, the CJEU left it up to the national court to decide whether ‘the maintenance of a certain degree of stability in clubs’ player rosters’ and a ‘a certain continuity in the related contracts’ must be regarded as ‘one of the possible means of contributing to the pursuit of the legitimate objective of general interest consisting in ensuring the regularity of interclub football competitions’.[14]

Despite this deference to the national court, the CJEU proceeded to hold that the FIFA system of compensation and other restrictions following a player’s unilateral termination of contract without just cause is disproportionate.[15]

The CJEU criticised the vagueness and lack of clarity of the criteria for determining the compensation for which both player and the new club engaging a player were held jointly and severally liable.[16]

In line with the rules set out in C‑333/21 European Superleague Company [2023] (“ESL”), the CJEU explained that any regulatory rule should be based on ‘criteria that are transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate’.[17] The CJEU said that the compensation scheme under the RSTP that includes reference to a player’s remuneration under their employment contract subsequently entered with a new club does not focus on factors related to the costs incurred by the former club and, such factors, should not be a part of the calculations.[18]

Further, the automatic nature of the liability for an unspecified level of compensation was problematic, as it does not take into account the actual conduct of a new club.[19] Further again, the automatic prohibition on the transfer of a player’s ITC by the former association was also problematic, as it prevents the player from being engaged by any club.[20]

Due to the CJEU’s assessment of proportionality, the relevant provisions of the RSTP are very likely to be considered in breach of TFEU article 45 when a final decision is made by the national court.

Regarding TFEU article 101, the CJEU considered the relevant provisions of the RSTP as “by object restrictions”, as they imposed ‘a generalised and drastic restriction of cross-border competition between clubs in the form of the unilateral recruitment of players who are already employed, and therefore of access by clubs to the essence of the “resource” represented by players’.[21] Classification of a rule as a “by object restriction” is significant due to the limited justification available. Under TFEU article 101 there is a difference between levels of non-discriminatory restrictions, which influences the available justification:

• De minimis restrictions on competition: these are restrictions of minor importance that do not appreciably restrict competition and automatically fall outside the scope of the article.[22]

• “By effect restrictions” on competition: these restrictions, while not revealing obvious harm, restrict competition by their effect. These restrictions can benefit from the test applicable to regulatory rules and explained in C‑519/04 P Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission [2006], (“Meca-Medina”), which is an equivalent to objective justification under TFEU article 45.[23] This classification is reserved only for sporting rules pursuing ‘certain ethical or principled objectives’.[24]

• “By object restrictions” on competition: these restrictions reveal by their very nature a sufficient degree of harm to competition that they may be considered as having as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. These restrictions can only be exempted on the basis of the economic efficiency test under TFEU article 101(3).

In accordance with the structural framework for sport designed by the Court in ESL, which limited and clarified the scope of Meca-Medina, classification as a “by object restriction” removes the opportunity for FIFA to rely on a functionally and a substantively equivalent justification framework to that available under article 45 TFEU. FIFA only has a chance of obtaining an exemption under the economic efficiency test of Art 101(3) TFEU.

An economic efficiency defence under article 101(3) TFEU is awkwardly designed for most sporting rules. To pass the test, FIFA would have to satisfy four cumulative conditions:

‘First, it must be demonstrated with a sufficient degree of probability that the [relevant provision of the RSTP] makes it possible to achieve efficiency gains, by contributing either to improving the production or distribution of the products or services concerned, or to promoting technical or economic progress. Second, it must be demonstrated, to the same degree of probability, that an equitable part of the profit resulting from those efficiency gains is reserved for the users. Third, the agreement, decision or practice in question must not impose on the participating undertakings restrictions which are not indispensable for achieving such efficiency gains. Fourth, that agreement, decision or practice must not give the participating undertakings the opportunity to eliminate all effective competition for a substantial part of the products or services concerned’.[25]

Once again, the CJEU left the ultimate decision on whether these conditions were met to the national court. However, the CJEU observed that, with reference to those points of disproportion identified above, the relevant provisions of the RSTP were prima facie disproportionate and as such did not meet at least the third of those four cumulative criteria of TFEU article 101(3).[26]

It is possible and legitimate for a rule to pursue both economic efficiency and public interest objectives, as mentioned by the CJEU in C-124/24 P International Skating Union v European Commission [2023]:

‘[…] even if it were established that the 2016 eligibility rules also pursue an objective of protecting the applicant’s economic interests, it should be noted that the fact that a federation seeks to protect its own economic interests is not in itself anticompetitive. As the Commission acknowledged at the hearing, the pursuit of economic objectives is an inherent feature of any undertaking, including a sports federation when it carries out an economic activity’.[27]

However, given the existing standards in football’s governing bodies, it would be difficult to achieve that standard in practice. The lack of genuine involvement and equal powers of all affected stakeholders (for example, FIFPRO in Diarra) in the decision-making process leaves certain interests inadequately protected, and football’s governing bodies will be persuaded by more powerful actors and guided by their own commercial interests. The Court in Diarra implicitly made this point when it emphasised that the transfer system established by FIFA favours some stakeholders (clubs) over others (players). This clearly stems from the structural inequalities in the composition of the main rule-making bodies in FIFA. Whilst the possibility of pursuing both the legitimate public interest and the economic efficiency objectives provides a lifeline for the restrictive rules that are genuinely aimed at both sets of objectives, this is something that can arguably be achieved only by true representation of affected stakeholders in football’s decision-making bodies.

Finally, it should be noted that Diarra only requires FIFA to redesign those relevant provisions of the RSTP providing the system of compensation and other restrictions for the unilateral breaches of contract without just cause. Diarra does not require the removal of those provisions. As explained below, FIFA is already working on these amendments, which will include the transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate compensation criteria as requested by the CJEU.

The projected impact of Diarra on the football industry is discussed next.

What Diarra means for football

After the retirement of Diego Armando Maradona, the world went in search of the “New Maradona”: a player whose talent and personality could shoulder the burden of the hopes of a nation while maintaining a style of play that made the game look easy, fun, a joy. Aimar, Ortega, Riquelme – each at some time a “New Maradona”. Yet none delivered in the way Argentina expected. Of course, football fans will know how this story ends. A boy from Rosario moves to Barcelona, shows the game new heights of individual brilliance, and ultimately leads Argentina to its first World Cup since Maradona graced the pitch.

Sports law has been on a similar journey. The impact of the CJEU’s decision in C‑415/93 Bosman[1995] (“Bosman”) speaks for itself. A case so impactful on the sport, and on sports law, that whole books have been written on its legacy.[28] Like Maradona, football has been awaiting its “New Bosman”:  a case to redefine the game’s relationship with the law. In Diarra, football might have one.

Perhaps one ought to say football might have another one. Given the extensive reference to ESL throughout Diarra, the CJEU clearly considers ESL to have set the framework for sports’ governing bodies’ rule-making latitude.

Whether Diarra has the same precedent value perhaps matters not; what matters is its impact on the operation of football, and in particular its potential to redefine the parameters of football’s idiosyncratic player transfer system, which has the potential to be more immediately far reaching than ESL.[29] Certainly, Diarra will precipitate a serious rethink about the relationship between players and clubs. At the heart of the player transfer system is an attempt to mediate between stability (or control) for clubs and leagues on the one hand, and player mobility on the other.

As noted above, Diarra emphasised the following:

‘[…] while it is permissible for an association such as FIFA to provide for sanctions to be imposed in the event of a breach of the rules which it adopts, provided that those rules and the sanctions intended to ensure compliance therewith are justified by the pursuit of a legitimate objective in the public interest, such sanctions can be accepted only on condition that they are determined within a framework of criteria that are transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate’.[30]

The critical question arising from Diarra is: what does a system that lawfully balances player mobility and sporting stability look like?

Given the CJEU’s excoriation of RSTP Article 17, it is hard to imagine it looking like the current system.

Although RSTP article 17.1 requires compensation to be calculated ‘with due consideration for the law of the country concerned’, Diarra identifies:

‘On the contrary, the official Commentary on the RSTP published by FIFA states that in reality the first criterion has virtually never been applied in practice, as the DRC essentially applies the regulations laid down by FIFA itself and, purely subsidiarily, Swiss law. Such a failure to actually take into account and therefore to actually comply with the law in force in the country concerned clearly goes beyond what may be necessary in order to maintain a certain degree of stability in clubs’ player rosters with a view to ensuring the regularity of interclub football competition’.[31]

Diarra also suggests that:

‘[…] the classic mechanisms of contract law, such as the right for the club to receive compensation in the event of a breach of contract by one of its players, at the instigation of another club where that is the case, in breach of the terms of that contract, are sufficient to ensure, on the one hand, the ongoing presence of that player in the first club mentioned, in accordance with those terms, and, on the other, the normal application between clubs of market rules, which allow them, on expiry of the normal term of the contract, or earlier if a financial agreement is concluded between clubs, to recruit the player in question’.[32]

Perhaps that is true to some degree, but absent a guiding and supervening regulatory framework, fragmentation could occur. Clubs could attempt to define the consequences for players’ breaches of their employment contracts (either directly, or through leagues where centrally agreed pro forma contracts are agreed). Inevitably, clubs would look to protect their own interests in doing so (subject to any safeguards or interventions afforded to or by players’ representative bodies).

Even taking aside the issue of fragmentation, this is likely to produce some undesirable consequences. Complex bilaterally negotiated provisions (subject to the observations included in the previous paragraph) might work for well-advised players, but that is an uncommon position. The transfer market is not just its headline cases, and research previously published by FIFPRO suggests that in fact most professional players are in a precarious position.[33] Ceding to national laws risks entrenching power dynamics and not addressing fundamental imbalances that have been, at least to an extent, calcified by the RSTP but which will exist even absent its current formulation.

To this end, it should be noted that the CJEU highlighted in Diarra that ‘the protection of workers is not among the objectives of FIFA, as defined in its Statutes’.[34] This is the starting point. This might be the kernel of the specificity of sport, and why FIFA is in an invidious position.

FIFA is competent to ‘subject the organisation and conduct of international competitions to common rules intended to guarantee the homogeneity and coordination of those competitions within an overall annual or seasonal calendar as well as, more broadly, to promote, in a suitable and effective manner, the holding of sporting competitions based on equal opportunities and merit’.[35]

Whereas by – or as a consequence of the RSTP – FIFA must now redesign a system that balances the demands of all of its stakeholders, and not least to rebalance the system such that it does not favour clubs at the expense of players. FIFA has since initiated a broad consultation on the consequences of Diarra.[36]

Inevitably, as with the design and implementation of the RSTP after Bosman, which took half a decade and involved friction between FIFA and the European Commission, this process may take some time.[37]

This gives clubs a difficult position to navigate. In terms of ongoing transfer business, Diarra has implications not just for players who terminate their contracts during the term of their agreement. Diarra will also fundamentally affect transfer values. The current transfer system is propped up by RSTP Article 17, which provides a significant incentive for players not to breach their contracts, and for clubs not to offer those players who breach a contract. Absent that effect, it is hard to imagine a system in which transfer fees are paid that do not bear a relation to the value of the contract in question.

Further, if player valuations reduce in line with a changing system, then the value of sell-on clauses in player transfer agreements (whereby a selling club obtains a percentage of any future transfer fee obtained by the buying club) will reduce with them, and clubs might be willing to take more or less risk on such clauses dependent on strategy and risk appetite.

Significant financial consequences may also develop. Currently, player registrations are treated as assets on a club’s balance sheet.[38] If it transpires that the value booked is fundamentally unrealisable, this may necessitate the raising of impairments, which en masse could have a significant impact on clubs’ finances. It will therefore be interesting to follow not just the direct impact on the transfer market, but also the approach auditors take to the asset values ascribed to player registrations.

Another obvious issue in a post-Diarra transfer system is that for many clubs, player trading (on top of, but sometimes instead of, player training and development) is a significant component in business strategy, and a route to improving its competitive profile. Whether those strategies are tenable in the reformulated system will depend on quite how commoditised the player trading system ends up remaining.

This also brings forth a significant point around which focus should coalesce as the RSTP is rewritten over the coming years. The post-Bosman design of the RSTP included, by necessity and by agreement with the European Commission, a significant wealth redistribution mechanism in the form of its training compensation and solidarity regimes.[39]  FIFA recently took steps to buttress this regime through the creation of the FIFA Clearing House to semi-automate training compensation and solidarity payments associated with international transactions.[40]

There is an opportunity to design a more predictable system, with the Clearing House at its epicentre, that duly incentives and rewards training clubs for the development of players. That system does not need to be tied to player transfers; the infrastructure now exists, and FIFA controls it. The CJEU did not substantively wrestle with the issue of wealth redistribution in Diarra. Nor ought it to have. The redistribution of wealth within football was not Diarra’s problem, nor indeed the problem of any player captured by the measures imposed by RSTP article 17. But if the nature of the market is to substantially change, as a corollary effect, FIFA will have to wrestle with that issue of wealth distribution.

So perhaps Diarra really will be the new Bosman. It remains to be seen whether the reshaped RSTP will be more Lionel Messi than Franco di Santo in the search for the new Maradona.

This article was written jointly by Thomas Horton, barrister at 3 Hare Court Chambers and founder of Football Law, Dr Kat Pijetlovic (Assistant Professor of Law at Católica Global School of Law and Católica Lisbon School of Law, and Head of Palestine Football Association Legal Department) and Christopher Flanagan (Associate Editor at the International Sports Law Journal and Head of Legal at Future).

Footnotes

[1] C‑650/22 FIFA v BZ [2024]

[2] C-650/22, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar.

[3] C-650/22, Request, 17 October 2022.

[4] (n2), [41].

[5] Ibid, [43]-[44].

[6] Ibid, [61]-[62].

[7]  Ibid, [68].

[8] Ibid, [69].

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid, [45].

[11] Ibid, [46].

[12] Ibid, [53]-[56].

[13] Ibid, [58].

[14] (n1), [102].

[15] Ibid, [104]-[113].

[16] Ibid, [105]-[106].

[17] Ibid, [111].

[18] Ibid, [106]-[107].

[19] Ibid, [108]-[110].

[20] Ibid, [111]-[113].

[21] Ibid, [140].

[22] C-291/1 Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice) [2014].

[23] C‑519/04 P Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission [2006], [42]-[48].

[24] C‑680/21 Royal Antwerp Football Club [2023], [113].

[25] (n1), [154].

[26] Ibid, [157].

[27] C-124/24 P International Skating Union v European Commission [2023], [109].

[28] The Legacy of Bosman: Revisiting the Relationship between EU law and Sport, eds. Antoine Duval and Ben Van Rompuy (Vienna / The Hague: Springer / T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016).

[29] Although it should be said that ESL is having a significant impact on the sport in subtler ways; cf. the extensive references to ESL in Manchester City Football Club Limited v The Football Association Premier League Limited, Arbitration under Premier League Rules, Section X (Ch. Sir Nigel Teare), 25 September 2024.

[30] (n1), [111].

[31] Ibid, [106].

[32] Ibid, [145].

[33] 2016 FIFPRO Global Employment Report, FIFPRO and University of Manchester (31 December 2016).

[34] (n1), [99].

[35] (n1), [143].

[36] See <https://inside.fifa.com/legal/football-regulatory/global-discussion-forum> (accessed 17 November 2024) and <https://inside.fifa.com/legal/football-regulatory/news/fifa-to-open-global-dialogue-on-article-17-of-the-regulations-on-the-status-and-transfer-of-players> (accessed 17 November 2024).

[37] For an overview, see The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players: Transnational Law-Making in the Shadow of Bosman, Antoine Duval. Chapter in The Legacy of Bosman: Revisiting the Relationship between EU law and Sport, eds. Antoine Duval and Ben Van Rompuy (Vienna / The Hague: Springer / T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016).

[38] Accounting for typical transactions in the football industry, IFRS Accounting Standards guide January 2024, PWC, <https://viewpoint.pwc.com/dt/gx/en/pwc/industry/football/accounting-for-typical/assets/PWC_accounting_for_typical_transactions_in_the_football_industry_v4.pdf> (accessed 17 November 2024).

[39] European Commission, Outcome of discussions between the Commission and FIFA / UEFA on FIFA Regulations on international football transfers, March 2001, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_01_314> (Accessed 17 November 2024).

[40] See <https://fifaclearinghouse.org/subuniverse-clearing-house/fifa-clearing-house-intro> (accessed 17 November 2024).

17 November 2024